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Abstract:
In IT Portfolio Management, Real Option Analysis (ROA) and Discounted Cash Flow 
(DCF) analysis are often used to place a quantitative value on an IT investment.  ROA 
is theoretically superior to DCF analysis because ROA specifically attempts to account 
for managerial flexibility or the ability of management to adjust to a changing 
situation.  However, while DCF analysis has been criticized as undervaluing IT 
projects, ROA has been criticized as overvaluing them.  
One possible explanation for an upward bias in ROA is that it often incorrectly 
assumes that managers will be able to make follow-on investments to an IT project if 
that project is successful, (i.e. Growth options).  Drawing from complexity theory and 
using project data from three large private organizations in the Mid-West we found 
that there was a log-linear relationship between the number of projects and SDLC 
phase.  The implication is that organizations primarily using internal IT resources are 
only able to develop a small number of late stage projects at a time.  
This in turn has important implications for Outsourcing, IT project portfolio 
management, and ROA.  Specifically many growth options used in calculating project 
value in ROA may be unrealistic given the limited resources of private organizations.
Keywords: IT Portfolio Management, Complexity Theory, Real Options Analysis
Introduction
One problem that continually faces CIO’s and IT managers is how to select and prioritize IT projects that become available to 
the organization.  IT project portfolios can contain hundreds of potential projects, however because of budgeting and resource 
constraints not all can typically be pursued.  In order to rank projects according to priority, firms typically use Discounted 
Cash Flow (DCF) analysis to determine Net Present Values (NPV).  Projects with positive NPVs are funded subject to the 
firm’s resource constraints.  However, DCF ignores managerial flexibility, for example the ability of managers to cancel a 
failing project or to expand a successful one.  Real Options Analysis (ROA) is an alternative way to value projects that 
attempts to explicitly place a value on this managerial flexibility to adapt.  
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One type of Real Option that is often embedded in IT projects is called a Growth Option.  Growth options are options to build 
a new project on top of a successful project.  For example, if a company successfully installs a Unix Server, it can then 
potentially build an e-Commerce Web site on an Apache Server.  Thus, in calculating the potential value of the Unix Server 
Project, the potential value of the e-Commerce Website should be considered.  However, is it realistic to assume that the firm 
will have the resources to build the follow-on project, in this case the e-Commerce Website?
Complexity theory is often used to explain the relationship between such diverse things as the frequency and severity of 
earthquakes, the frequency and severity of floods, the distribution of human populations, and the fluctuations of commodity 
prices over time.  A key characteristic of complexity theory is that the number and magnitude of events follow a log-log or 
log-linear pattern. Inspired by an example by Peter Grassberger (Bak, 1996, pg. 54-55) on the potential use of complexity 
theory in organizations, we discovered that for several large organizations in the Mid West the number of projects in any 
given stage of the SDLC followed such a, pattern indicating that they may be complex systems.  That is, there were far more 
projects in the early phases of the SDLC than in the later phases, in one case by a factor of almost a hundred. This has major 
implications to firms using Real Option Analysis (ROA), particularly in firms that are depending on embedded growth 
options to calculate project values.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  First, the background of this research is given in order to place it within the 
proper frame of reference.  Second, a short explanation of Real Option Analysis is given.  Although ROA is not the 
substantial focus of this work per se, the implications of this research are.  Third, a short literature review of the major works 
on complexity theory is given, followed by a rationale for why complexity theory may be pertinent to IT Portfolio 
Management.  Fourth, information regarding our hypotheses, model, data and results are presented.  Lastly implications and 
areas for further study are discussed.
Background 
At the behest of several large private organizations our team has been developing a staged portfolio management 
methodology to assist executives and IT managers in selecting and prioritizing their IT project portfolios.  Our methodology 
is a strategy focused methodology that is based on and extends Kaplan and Norton’s work with Strategy Maps and is 
currently being explored by IT teams within several large Fortune 500 companies.  Although this paper will focus on just a 
small part of our work, it is briefly summarized here in order to properly frame this research.  The stages in our methodology 
are:
Stage 1: Develop a Strategy Map (Kaplan and Norton, 2002) for the organization that visually shows how proposed IT 
investments link to the strategic goals of the firm.  Investments that are obviously not linked to company strategy are usually 
pruned during this stage from further consideration. 
Stage 2: Develop Aggregate Project Maps that visually show how the potential IT investments balance the tradeoff between 
Business Criticality and Technological Maturity.  Business Criticality scores represent how much a particular project aligns 
with firm strategy, while Technological Maturity scores represent how mature the technology needed to produce the project 
is within the firm -- in the opinion of the firm’s executives.  These scores are developed using scoring models that are unique 
to the firm, and are based on the knowledge and experience of the firm’s IT management team.  Those projects that obviously 
do not give a suitable return on this tradeoff are usually dropped at this stage.  Although Aggregate Project Maps are not a 
focus of this article, a simple example for one section of an IT department is shown below in Figure 1.
Stage 3:  Rank the remaining IT projects quantitatively using several different criteria, so that they can be prioritized for 
investment.  Currently we are using several different methods to rank the IT projects.
A. Projects ranked by risk category.  Different firms have different tolerances for risk, which may change over time.  
Certain projects may simply be too risky to be palatable for a firm.
B. Projects ranked by Criticality vs. Technological Maturity efficiency.  As can be seen visually in Figure 1, some 
projects give a better return on criticality vs. maturity than others.  We also use some traditional quantitative 
techniques, i.e. portfolio optimization to identify and prioritize efficient IT investments.
C. Projects ranked using Real Option Analysis.
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Figure 1: Example of an Aggregate Project Map
Real Option Analysis
As mentioned above, IT projects can be ranked using traditional Discounted Cash Flow techniques, which attempt to put a 
quantitative value on IT investments.  One weakness of this technique is that it ignores the managerial flexibility to adapt to 
changing situations.  Instead DCF usually calculates a single value based on the current information available and firms 
invest in all projects with a positive NPV.  The difficulty in using this method is that projections of cash flows are based on 
assumptions that often change.  Also, in order to reflect the uncertain nature of IT investments cash flows are typically 
discounted at rates reflecting the high variance inherent in technology investments.  Thus, the calculated net present values of 
such projects are easily undervalued.
ROA attempts to account for managerial flexibility or the ability of management to adjust to a changing situation.  As a 
simple example, a manager faced with the decision to invest in Betamax or VHS equipment in the early 1980’s would be 
greatly challenged using DCF analysis because at that time it was not clear which standard would eventually dominate.  
Because DCF analysis gives a one-time answer both investments might have a calculated negative NPV.  However, this 
standard “go/no go” or “yes/no” decision process can be refined using Real Options Analysis to give a greater range of 
choices for investment, “invest now”, “invest never”, or in this example “defer investment” until a standard has been chosen 
by the market.  In a sense the value of a project can be thought of as:
Project Value = NPV + the value of the real options associated with the investment
The types of options commonly associated with IT investments are listed in Table 1 (Benaroch, 2002).  By specifically 
embedding and accounting for real options in IT investments, managers can increase the calculated value of IT projects using 
either the Black-Scholes or Binomial Option models.
However, one issue that became apparent in our work was that ROA has the potential to greatly over-value a project when 
large parts of its value are derived from staged, scale up, and particularly growth options.  Simply put, firms simply do not 
appear to have the capability to invest in all of the projects they determine to be valuable.
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Table 1: Common Option Types
Option Description
Defer The option to delay investment until more information can be learned about the project, such as costs, prices, 
demand etc.
Stage The option to build a project in stages, where investment can be delayed or even killed if the environment 
changes.
Explore The option to use a pilot program to better learn about a project before initiating it on a full-scale basis.
Scale The option to increase or decrease the scale of a project depending upon its success.
Abandon The option to kill a project if it goes badly.
Outsource The option to subcontract a project or part of a project to shift some downside risks to a third party.
Lease The option to lease some resources to shift some downside risks to a third party.
Growth A set of projects where the value of earlier projects depends largely on investments in additional projects, i.e. 
an infrastructure investment that assumes follow-on investments will be made using that infrastructure.
Compound A combination of the above options in one project.
Complexity Theory
Complexity theory has its roots in the natural sciences and Darwin’s the “Origin of the Species”, which describes the process 
of natural selection, is often given as its starting point.  No centralized authority is assumed to guide evolution under 
Darwin’s theories; it is self-organizing (Darwin, 1859).  Likewise, the laws of thermodynamics state that left alone closed 
systems tend towards higher entropy and equilibrium.  However, if a system is an open system and even a small amount of 
energy is absorbed from outside then the system will tend to self-organize, and not reach equilibrium.  As a simple example, 
people eat food and therefore survive.  If a person did not absorb energy through food, they would die (Prigogine et al., 
1984).
Herbert Simon (1996) is often credited with beginning the study of complexity in organizations while John Holland has 
produced two fundamental works in this area, “Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems” (1992) and “Hidden Order: 
how adaptation builds complexity” (1996).  The latter is particularly important because modeling interacting agents in 
business is a major research area within complexity theory.  Basically multiple agents interacting using simple rules can 
produce surprisingly complex behavior in a system, for example the “Bullwhip Effect” within supply chains.
Per Bak (1996) went further and suggested that organizations may themselves be open, self-organized, critical and complex 
systems.    Self-organized criticality is the idea that systems naturally slowly evolve to a critical state which periodically 
experience radical change.  The classic example is the sand pile model.  If grains of sand are continuously piled on a flat 
surface they will build up into a hill which over time will experience many small avalanches and a few large avalanches.
The initial impetus for this work initially came from this idea of self-organized criticality.  Complexity theory suggests that 
such systems actually follow predictable patterns.  These patterns are exhibited by many wide ranging seemingly unrelated 
phenomenon such as earthquakes, river floods, city sizes, extinctions and commodity price fluctuations.  These phenomena 
can all be classified as “complex systems” and generally follow power law distributions where the size of an event is 
proportional to its frequency, N=1/f.  For example, earthquakes follow the Gutenberg-Richter model.  That is, the number of 
large earthquakes is exponentially smaller than the number of large ones.  
This pattern is predictable but stochastic, meaning that exactly when large earthquakes or commodity price fluctuations will 
occur remains unpredictable, but the number of earthquakes per year is very predictable, much like flipping a coin.  That is, 
given many flips of a fair coin it is possible to predict that roughly half will be heads, yet it is not possible to predict what the 
next flip will be.  Earthquakes, commodity prices and many other systems in nature follow such stochastic behavior, but with 
a 1/f pattern as opposed to the simple Bernoulli pattern exhibited by a coin.    
Peter Grassberger suggested that concepts from complexity might also help explain organizational behavior, in particular the 
interaction between different employees and groups within a firm (Bak, 1996, pg. 54-55).  Although not universally agreed 
upon, the general characteristics of complex systems (Anderson, 1999, pg. 3-15;Kelley and Allison, 1998; Bak, 1996, pg. 1-
32)  and how they might relate to IT are:
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• Complex systems are open: Unlike traditional models used in many parts of economics and business, complex 
systems are open systems; they are not in equilibrium.  In project management, projects are not managed in a 
vacuum.  Current events, corporate politics, and even other projects will all influence the life cycle of a project.
• Complex systems can be nested:  Complex systems are naturally made up of many parts, some of which may be 
complex systems themselves.  In terms of an IT project, a project may be worked on by many different departments 
or teams each of which may themselves be complex systems.  Also, one major project may consist of many sub-
projects, such as an SAP installation and its many sub-components.
• Complex systems have a history:  In neo-classical economics, firms are often considered to be homogeneous such 
as in perfect competition.    However, in complex systems, much like in the Resource Based View of the firm 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986), this is specifically not considered to be true.  The most important organizational 
resources may be unique, and a firm’s future may be quite sensitive to initial conditions.  In terms of project 
management some IT departments may have built strong Java skills, others may have strong C++ skills, and still 
others may have strong design skills.  These unique skills and experiences are developed over time and affect a 
firm’s future choices.
• Complex systems emerge: Complex systems are made up of many agents following simple rules that may produce 
complex interactions.  Therefore, studying the component parts of a complex system does not necessarily explain 
the overall behaviour of the system.  In project management a particular manager and a particular development team 
may both work well separately, but they may not get along when working together.  Likewise, an IT infrastructure 
project that by itself has a low NPV may enable the firm to make several follow-up investments with much higher 
NPV’s.
• Relationships are often non-linear:  Unlike in simple systems, in complex systems a small input may have no 
effect, a proportional effect, or an extraordinary effect on outcomes.  This is a common experience in IT where a 
new technology may completely fail despite huge investments or may result in supernormal profits using just 
minimal initial investments.
• Relationships contain feedback loops: Complex systems often have feedback loops which reinforce themselves.  In 
IT, a firm that successfully invests in a particular technology will often continue to invest in similar technologies, 
which leads to more success and additional investments.
• Complex systems exhibit self-organized criticality:  Complex systems often experience a long slow evolution to a 
critical state followed by a rapid very large change (Bak, 1997).  In terms of a project one way this would be 
exhibited is by a change from one phase of the SDLC to another phase.  This is very similar in concept to punctuated 
equilibrium (Orlikowski, 1996).  For example, a project that replaces an old 10 base T Ethernet network may 
languish at the design stage of the SDLC for years until network congestion eventually compels the organization to 
green light the project and move it to the development stage.  When the new network is installed it will likely be a 
significantly faster network, which in turn may significantly speed up other applications that depend on network 
bandwidth. 
Model
Project management as taught in the classroom often follows the traditional System Design Life Cycle (SDLC).  Whether 
there are four, five, six, or seven phases in the model depends largely on the particular book used and the organization 
teaching it.  However, two characteristics these models tend to have in common are that:
a.) Later phases in the SDLC tend to require much greater resources and organizational commitment than earlier 
phases.
b.) These models tend to neglect outside influences and focus on the project as a separate unit from the overall 
organization.
Because we believe that IT portfolio management is actually a dynamic complex system which exhibits many of the 
characteristics discussed in the prior section, we hypothesize that within an IT portfolio of projects, the number of IT projects 
by SDLC phase will follow a log-linear model.  This is consistent with Grassberger’s suggestion about using complexity 
theory for organizations.  Although power laws typically suggest a log-log relationship, a semi-log relationship is predicted 
because the time and resources required in each stage is assumed to be exponentially greater than the stage immediately prior.  
For example, if the SDLC model used is that shown in Table 2, then it is assumed in our model that the time, money and 
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resources used in Analysis are exponentially larger than those used in the Feasibility Study.  This makes sense as the number 
of people affected in each phase of a project typically grows by phase.  That is, the number of end users is usually greater 
than the number of developers which is usually greater than the number of system architects.
Table 2: Phases in the SDLC
Phase Name
1 Feasibility Study
2 Analysis
3 Design
4 Development
5 Testing
6 Implementation
Specifically we hypothesize that:
Ln(y) = x + c
where y = Number of projects at that phase, and x is SDLC project phase, or
Ln(number of projects) = (project phase) + c
Our initial assumption was that Ln(y) would follow a normal distribution, but upon further research, consistent with Agresti, 
it was thought that the dependent variable in the above model might be better fitted by a Poisson distribution (Agresti, 1996, 
pg. 71-102).  This is known as the identity link for a generalized linear model that assumes a log-linear relationship.  In actual 
fact, using the Poisson distribution made only a marginal improvement in the fit of the model, but the Poisson distribution is 
the traditional statistical technique for modeling count data, and specifically assumes that there cannot be a negative count.. 
Data
Data was obtained from three large organizations located in the Midwest.  Two were IT project portfolios from sections of 
Fortune 500 companies.  One was an IT project Portfolio from an educational organization.  The data obtained is listed in 
Tables 3a, 3b, and 3c.
Organization 1 is a division of a large Fortune 500 company.  Generally the time horizons of these projects are less than three 
years1, usually a year or less.  Organization 2 is from an IT team that is focusing on innovation and new technology also 
within a large Fortune 500 company.  These projects are more speculative in nature than those in Organization 1; however 
they follow a staged lifecycle.   The major difference between these two portfolios is that all four stages of Organization 2’s 
portfolio can be thought of as being subsets of the Pre-Initiate Phase of Organization 1.  That is, when projects in 
Organization 2 reach Phase 4 they will graduate to what would be considered the Initiate and Requirements phases of 
Organization 1.  Organization 3 is a University in the Midwest.  The stages are listed in the table as they are used within the 
organization.  These projects are more similar to Organization 1 in that they are likely to be implemented over the next three 
years.
As can be seen the number of projects and the SDLC methodology used in the three organizations is somewhat different.  It 
also should be noted that the project sizes and resource requirements needed is also very heterogeneous both within and 
between the three organizations’ project portfolios.  Dollar amounts for each project ranges from thousands to millions of 
dollars particularly in Organization 1.  This is not necessarily a problem using complexity theory, as one characteristic of a 
complex system is that they may be scale free much like fractals found in the fjords of Norway are scale free (Mandelbrot, 
1983; Bak, 1997).  That is, although the projects may appear to be heterogeneous, the assumption is they follow similar rules
because a project is a project no matter what its size.
1
 The Initiate and Requirements phases of Organization 1 were combined because they were thought to basically map to what 
is usually referred to as the Analysis phase in the traditional SDLC.  Also, Organization 1 considered three years to be long-
term IT projects.  Most projects were budgeted for one year or less.
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Table 3b: Data for Organization 2: IT Innovation Team of a Large Fortune 500 
Firm
Phase Name Number  of Projects ln(number of projects)
1 19 2.944439
2 10 2.302585
3 3 1.098612
4 1 0
Table 3c: Data for Organization 3: IT Department of a University in the Mid-West
Phase Name Number  of Projects ln(number of projects)
requested 15 2.70805
seeking funding 9 2.197225
funded active 6 1.791759
initiated 4 1.386294
closed 2 0.693147
Results
The data was regressed using both Log-Linear Poisson regression and Log-Linear Normal regression.  Our original model 
assumed a normal distribution for the dependent variable; however after researching Agresti we determined that a Poisson 
distribution was also applicable (Agresti, 1996, pg. 71-102).  Both models fit well, as shown by the plotted data below, 
however the Poisson distribution fit slightly better, particularly in the later phases of the SDLC.  The regression statistics 
below are those that assume a Poisson distribution.  The Log-Likelihood ratio tests and Wald statistics are all significant, as 
are all the intercepts and coefficients for the variable Phase.  The regression results are shown in Tables 4a, 4b and 4c, with 
the predicted vs. actual values shown in Figures 2, 3, and 4.
Table 3a: Data for Organization 1: Division of a Large Fortune 500 Firm
Phase Name Number  of Projects ln(number of projects)
Pre-Initiate 398 5.986452
Initiate  + Requirements 121 4.795791
Design 35 3.555348
Build/Test 15 2.70805
Deploy 6 1.791759
In production 4 1.386294
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Table 4a: Poisson Regression Results for Organization 1
Criterion DF Value Value/DF
PR > 
ChiSQ
Deviance 4 5.2226 1.3056 -
Pearson Chi-
Square 4 6.4797 1.6199 -
Wald Statistic 1 490.07 - < .0001
Log Liklihood - 2562.6409 - -
Log-Liklihood 
Ratio 1 991.75 - < .0001
Table 4b: Poisson Regression Results for Organization 1
Parameter DF Estimate
Standard 
Error
Wald 95 % Confidence 
Limits
Chi-
Square
Pr > Chi-
Square
Intercept 1 7.0733 0.0852 6.9063 7.2404 6887.04 <.0001
Phase 1 -1.1104 0.0502 -1.2087 -1.0121 490.07 <.0001
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Figure 2: Fitted Data for Organization 1
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Table 5a: Poisson Regression Results for Organization 2
Criterion DF Value Value/DF
PR > 
ChiSQ
Deviance 2 0.5748 0.2874 -
Pearson Chi-
Square 2 0.5882 0.2941 -
Wald Statistic 1 18.419602 - < .0001
Log Liklihood - 48.9786 - -
Log-Liklihood 
Ratio 1 24.68 - < .0001
Table 5b: Poisson Regression Results for Organization 2
Parameter DF Estimate
Standard 
Error Wald 95 % Confidence Limits
Chi-
Square
Pr > Chi-
Square
Intercept 1 3.8956 0.3721 3.1663 4.6248 109.62 <.0001
Phase 1 -0.8957 0.2087 -1.3047 -0.4867 18.42 <.0001
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Figure 3: Fitted Data for Organization 2
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Table 6a: Poisson Regression Results for Organization 3
Criterion DF Value Value/DF
PR > 
ChiSQ
Deviance 3 0.0859 0.0286 -
Pearson Chi-
Square 3 0.08555 0.0285 -
Wald Statistic 1 12.195495 - 0.0005
Log Liklihood - 42.0348 - -
Log-Liklihood 
Ratio 1 13.94 - < .0002
Table 6b: Poisson Regression Results for Organization 3
Parameter DF Estimate
Standard 
Error
Wald 95 % Confidence 
Limits
Chi-
Square
Pr > Chi-
Square
Intercept 1 3.1739 0.3329 2.5214 3.8263 90.9 <.0001
Phase 1 -0.4704 0.1347 -0.7345 -0.2064 12.19 0.0005
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Figure 4: Fitted Data for Organization 3
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Discussion
As can be seen from the graphs and regression statistics given above, the model fit surprisingly well given the heterogeneous 
nature of the projects both between and within firms.   However, this is consistent with the idea of Complexity Theory, which 
would predict that all such complex systems would follow a similar pattern.  The results seem to indicate that firms are 
simply unable to move all of the projects that they would like to later phases of the SDLC.  As can be seen even the largest 
organization was unable to be in the final phases of the SDLC for more than a half dozen projects.  
The idea that a firm is limited by its internal resources is an old one.  Edith Penrose viewed the firm as a “collection of 
productive resources” (Penrose, 1959 pg. 24), and argued that a scarcity of managerial talent effectively limits the growth of 
a firm.  Similarly, the Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm suggests that firms can only develop a competitive advantage 
using resources that are valuable, imperfectly imitable, imperfectly substitutable and above all rare (Wernerfelt, 1984).  This 
limitation, often imposed by a scarcity of managerial talent, is especially important because the managers in all of the 
organizations in question supervised multiple projects. 
While a drop off in the number of projects in each phase is not surprising, (traditional SDLC courses teach that projects can 
be and should be cancelled), what is surprising is that they seem to drop off very sharply and in a very predictable log-linear 
way.  This has important implications for Real Options Analysis, notably:
• If these firms are indeed complex systems, as the results seem to indicate, then it is not generally possible to increase 
project throughput without changing the system.  One characteristic of complex systems is that they exhibit such 
log-linear relationships and these are generally persistent over time (Bak, 1997).
• Calculated project values that depend on growth or scale up options may be significantly overvalued.  It appears that 
even the largest firms are limited in the number of projects they finish at one time, and therefore the assumption that
a large portion of a project’s value will come from future follow-on projects may be untenable.
• In addition, the severe drop off in projects in the early phases could indicate that firms place a lot of value in 
abandonment and/or deferment options – basically trying out a bunch of speculative projects knowing that many 
will prove unprofitable and be cancelled.
Finally, we have some preliminary evidence, which will be used in a follow-on research project that suggests that 
organizations that primarily outsource their work, rather than use in-house resources do not face a log-linear decrease in the 
number of projects by phase.  Such organizations are not as complex in the sense that their IT projects are handled by other 
organizations.  When these results were discussed with the CIO of Organization 1, he was somewhat aware of this 
phenomenon, and explained that his firm was able to produce projects cheaper in-house, and was willing to put up with a 
lower project completion rate in exchange for lower cost outlays.
Future Research
While the above results are interesting, they leave many important questions unanswered.  Why does the number of projects 
drop off the way it does?  Does management realize the trend and purposely pursue many abandonment and deferment 
options?  Do more homogeneous mixtures of projects follow the same trend? Does the slope of the curves have any particular 
managerial significance?  Does the trend hold across other firms and industries?  And finally, does the industry or sector the 
organization is in significantly affect the trend?  
Our preliminary investigations on this last point suggest that it does, and in some cases greatly, however it is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  Further information regarding our methodology in IT Portfolio management is available upon request in 
the form of a working paper.
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